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I.

THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS THE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION STANDARD.
The only issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred in granting a new

trial. Tooele Associates, L.P. ("TA") argues that, because no party filed a motion for a
new trial, the standard of review typically applied to new trial decisions is inapplicable.
TA does not explain why a motion by one of the parties makes the difference between
application of the abuse of discretion standard and the correction of error standard. None
of the cases holding that the abuse of discretion standard applies to mistrial rulings places
any emphasis on whether the determination was precipitated by a motion or the trial
court's initiative. Controlling case law accords deference to trial courts in ordering new
trials, not just in granting or denying motions for new trials.1
According to controlling authority, a motion for a new trial is not the reason that
the abuse of discretion standard applies to mistrial decisions. The abuse of discretion
standard applies because of the trial court's unique perspective and

1

Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988) ("A trial court has some discretion in
deciding whether or not to grant a new trial, and we reverse only when that discretion is
abused."); Hvland v. St. Mark's Hosp., 427 P.2d 736, 738 (Utah 1967) ("Consistent with
the purpose just discussed, whenever what has transpired in the proceeding is so
offensive to the trial court's sense of justice that he believes the desired objective of
affording the parties a fair trial has failed, he has both the prerogative and the duty to
grant a new trial. This court has always recognized that the trial court has a broad
discretion in doing so, and that his ruling thereon should not be overturned unless it
appears that his action was arbitrary, or that it clearly transgressed any reasonable bounds
of discretion."); Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Gerben 526 P.2d 1121,1123-24 and n.3
(Utah 1974) (holding that trial court has discretion to grant a new trial on its own
initiative).
2

Wellman v. Noble. 366 P.2d 701, 704 (Utah 1961). Contrary to TA's argument (TA's
Rply. at 1 n.l), Wellman was overruled by Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993),
1
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so [the trial judge] can fulfill his duty of general supervision over legal
proceedings and have a remedy to apply when he is convinced that there has been
substantial and prejudicial error, or the judgment is contrary to the evidence, or the
law, or for any other reason there has been a miscarriage of justice.
Johnson v. Doctorman, 462 P.2d 169, 170 (Utah 1969) (quoting Uptown Appliance &
Radio Co. v. Flint 249 P.2d 826 (Utah 1952)); see also Hyland, 427 P.2d at 738.
Moreover, an interpretation offered to reconcile special verdict answers should be
supported by a "view of the case," i.e., "a reasonable theory consistent with the
evidence,5'3 which represents a "'logical and probable decision on the relevant issues as
presented."5 Mercer v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc.. 665 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting
Griffin v. Matherne, 471 F.2d 911,915 (5th Cir. 1973)). The trial court is in the best
position to view the case as a whole and make these determinations, and a motion is
unnecessary to the fulfillment of that role.
TA concedes that "harmonizing a jury verdict [requires] consideration of] the
verdict from the jury's perspective—requiring the court to consider the jury verdict form
and the 'case as submitted5 to the jury, including jury instructions and the evidence and
arguments presented at trial.'5 (TA5s 1st Brf. at 44.) TA even relies on the trial court's
views on the evidence to support its Special Verdict Form ("SVF") interpretation. (TA5s
only "to the extent [it] approve[d] the use of the [unavoidable accident jury] instruction."
Randle, 862 P.2d at 1336. Otherwise, Wellman is controlling in Utah.
3

Guv v. City of San Diego, 608 F.3d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 2010); Watts v. United Parcel
Serv., 378 Fed. Appx. 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2010) ("'[W]e look for a reasonable way to read
the answers to interrogatories as expressing a coherent and reasonable view of the case5
and 'make this consistency determination by referring to the jury charge and the total
context of the special verdict.555 (emphasis added) (Quoting Tipton v. Michelin Tire Co.,
101 F.3d 1145, 1148 (6th Cir. 1996)).
2
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Rply. at 15-16 and n.24.) Accordingly, the trial court's grant of a new trial due to
irreconcilable conflict in the SVF falls squarely within the rationale supporting the
application of the abuse of discretion standard to orders for new trials.
II.

THE CITY PRESERVED ITS BOND AGREEMENT RIGHT TO DENY
NEW PHASES BASED UPON INCOMPLETE PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS.
In its opening brief, TA argued that Tooele City ("City") did not even mention

until after trial its Bond Agreement right to deny new phases. After the City pointed out
all the ways in which it preserved that right, including in the Pre-Trial Order, TA now
argues, without citing any authority, that the City should have presented it to the jury.
Indeed, TA now asserts that "[i]n this case, the issue is whether a legal theory that was
hidden from the Jury can void the Jury's mixed findings of fact and law." (TA's Rply. at
12 n.18 (emphasis added).) TA never articulated that issue in either its Petition to Appeal
Interlocutory Order or in its opening brief.4
TA cites no authority in support of its argument, which conflates the role of judge
and jury in a special verdict case. Essentially, TA argues that the City should have had
the jury take on the Court's role of applying the law to the jury's factual findings.
4

As a fall back, TA argues that in the Pre-Trial Order, the City only preserved its Bond
Agreement right upon a material breach by TA of the Bond Agreements. (TA's Rply. at
4 n.4, 22.) TA is wrong. The City preserved its position in the Pre-Trial Order:
"The non-completion of the required public improvements is a material breach of the
Annexation Agreement, the Development Agreement and Bond Agreements, which
excuse and discharge the City's performance of the Development Agreement, and it
allows the City to withhold approval of new phases. . . . " (R. 21915 (emphasis added).)
This statement preserves, among other things, the City's position that u[t]he noncompletion of the required public improvements . . . allows the City to withhold approval
of new phases." (Id.) Nothing in that statement conditions the City's Bond Agreement
right upon a material breach by TA. Indeed, the City had always taken the position that it
need not prove a material breach to invoke such right. (R. 13173-75.)
3
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However, "'[i]n [the] case of a special verdict, the jury only finds the facts, and the court
applies the law thereto and renders the verdict'" Dishinger v. Potter, 2001 UT App 209
If 17, 47 P.3d 76 (emphasis added) (alterations in original) (quoting Brigham v. Moon
LakeElec. Ass'n, 470 P.2d 393, 397 (Utah 1970)). In this case, the trial court decided to
use a special verdict form rather than a general verdict, so the City did not need to make
sure the jury was instructed on its Bond Agreement right to deny new phases. In special
verdict cases, trial courts apply legal principles, so "'[instructions to the jury are thus
simplified.'" Id at 117 (quoting Brigham, 470 P.2d at 397). One of the reasons to
employ a special verdict is to avoid having to instruct the jury on each and every legal
principle that might bear on the outcome.
It was unnecessary for the jury to decide the issue of whether TA's Bond
Agreement breaches would prevent TA's recovery of damages. The trial court had
already resolved that question as a matter of law. Before trial, the trial court ruled as a
matter of law that "'the Bond Agreements do, indeed, vest authority in the City to deny
further phases based upon incomplete public improvements.'" (R. 21874 ^f 32 (quoting
R. 14351).) The Pre-Trial Order definitively established that TA's damages theory
depended upon the ability to develop further phases. (R. 21909.) These matters were
already established, so they did not need to be determined by the jury.
Accordingly, the City did not need to spend scarce trial time presenting the jury
with its Bond Agreement right to deny new phases until the improvements in prior phases
were completed. That right was already established by the trial court as the law of this
case; it could be applied by the trial court after the special verdict was rendered; and the
4 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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City could instead focus on the issues upon which such right depended, namely, proving
that TA failed to complete the public improvements and disproving TA's waiver and
estoppel contentions.
III.

THE CITY'S BOND AGREEMENT RIGHT TO DENY NEW PHASES IS
THE LAW OF THE CASE.
In support of its argument that the City's Bond Agreement right to deny new

phases is not the law of the case, TA relies on federal law, which conflicts with Utah law,
and TA ignores the Pre-Trial Order. Utah law provides that "'a decision made on an
issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation.'"
Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43 If 12, 216 P.3d 352 (quoting
IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., 2008 UT 73 H 26, 196 P.3d 588). "'[T]he
parties are bound by the court's prior decision.'" Id. (quoting IHC Health Servs, 2008
UT 73 f 27). Although "'the [trial] court remains free to reconsider that decision,'"5 the
trial court in this case never reconsidered its ruling that "the Bond Agreements do,
indeed, vest authority in the City to deny further phases based upon incomplete public
improvements." (R. 14351.) On the contrary, in the middle of the trial, the parties and
the trial court agreed that among the "MATTERS FOUND AND/OR RESOLVED BY
THE COURT" was the City's Bond Agreement right to deny new phases based upon
incomplete public improvements. (R. 21864, 21874 Tj 32.) Accordingly, that right is the
law of the case.

5

Id (quoting IHC Health Servs., 2008 UT 73 127).
5
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TA argues that the trial court's ruling may be overturned by this Court. (TA's
Rply. at 10 n.14.) Again, TA is wrong. This interlocutory appeal concerns only the trial
court's June 3, 2010 decision to grant a new trial. (8/18/10 Utah Ct. App. Order.)
Neither side asked for permission to appeal the trial court's August 13, 2008 ruling that
"the Bond Agreements do, indeed, vest authority in the City to deny further phases based
upon incomplete public improvements,"6 and the time to seek such permission has
expired. Utah R. App. P. 5(a). Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the
trial court's August 13, 2008 ruling. State ex rel S.K. v. State, 2005 UT App 248 (per
curiam).
IV.

THE JURY NOWHERE DETERMINED THAT TA'S BOND
AGREEMENT BREACHES WERE HYPER-TECHNICAL OR EASILY
FIXABLE, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE.
TA's argument that its Bond Agreement breaches were insignificant conflicts with

the evidence. When the one or two-year Bond Agreement deadlines passed, TA had
failed to complete 400 West, 2000 North, Berra Blvd., Aaron Dr., and sidewalks and
landscaping along those streets; it failed to install street lights, reflector signs, ADA
corner ramps, street monuments, decorative bollards, street signs, storm drain pipe, storm
drain boxes, storm drain box tops, sewer/storm drain collars, concrete collars around
manholes and valves, and hydrants; TA failed to enlarge the temporary storm water
6

R. 14351.

n

TA's refusal to complete the south side of 2000 North in Phase 1J is supported by R.
24340 p. 2183 and Exhibit 685 at the Phase U as-built drawings, C-6 through C-8, which
were prepared by TA's own engineers. (R. 24337 pp. 1457-58, 1464.)
6
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detention facility; and TA left valves buried in asphalt so that they could only be found
with a metal detector. (City's Brf. at 15-16 and n.15.) The defective conditions on 400
West caused or contributed to car accidents. (Ex. 355 at 3.) The jury found that TA's
failure to complete the public improvements caused the City to suffer $1,750,000 in
damages. (R. 22167.)
Contrary to TA's portrayal, the City did everything it could to get TA, and even
TA's joint venture partner, to fix the problems, but they refused. In the summer of 2004,
TA expressed a desire to finish the phases one at a time, beginning with Phase IB. (R.
24340 pp. 2208-09.) The City engineer spent two days walking through the Overlake
subdivision, most of the time with Mr. Hall, identifying types of defects. (Id., Ex. 157.)
At Mr. Hall's request, Mr. Hansen prepared and sent a list of defects for Phase IB. (R.
24340 pp. 2208-09; Ex. 611.) Even though Mr. Hansen's letter accurately listed the
Phase IB defects, as later verified by TA's engineers at Forsgren & Associates, Inc., Mr.
Hall responded that TA had no intention of correcting them or any defects in Overlake.
(R. 24337 pp. 1469-70; 24340 pp. 2209-10.)
TA asserts that all the City had to do was ask a third party, Perry Homes, to fix the
problems, and all would be solved. The jury's answer to Question 6 refutes TA's
assertion. If the City could have so easily mitigated TA's public improvement
deficiencies, then Jury Instruction 41—the "Mitigation and Avoidance" instruction—
directed the jury to exonerate TA on the City's breach of Bond Agreement claims. (R.
22215.) The jury, however, did the opposite, which means that it rejected TA's claim

7
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that the City could have easily fixed TA's public improvement deficiencies by turning to
Perry Homes.8 (R. 22166 Q. 6.)
The jury had sufficient evidence to reject TA's assertion. The City did approach
Perry Homes about TA's public improvement deficiencies, and Perry Homes was
unwilling to take on TA's obligations. (R. 24339 pp. 2006-07.)
V.

THE JURY NOWHERE FOUND THAT TA SUBSTANTIALLY
PERFORMED THE BOND AGREEMENTS.
According to TA, the jury found that TA substantially performed the Bond

Agreements. According to TA, the jury found that TA substantially performed the
Development Agreement; and TA maintains that the Development Agreement's public
improvement requirements were the same as those under the Bond Agreements. TA's
argument is wrong because the jury was never asked to determine whether TA
substantially performed the Bond Agreements, and the jury could find that the Bond
Agreement requirements differed from TA's Development Agreement duties.9

The jury must be presumed to have followed jury instructions. Moore v. Burton
Lumber & Hardware Co. .631 P.2d 865, 869 (Utah 1981).
9

As an initial matter, TA's position that the Development Agreement subsumed the Bond
Agreements conflicts with its explanation as to how the SVF is reconcilable. In its reply
brief, TA for the first time cites a Development Agreement provision—§ XVII—as the
Development Agreement clause that allegedly incorporated the Bond Agreements. (TA's
Rply. at 13-14.) That section was the subject of an SVF question—Question 2.b.—and in
response to that question, the jury found that TA "materially breached the Development
Agreement" by failing to comply with that very provision. (R. 22164.) If § XVII
subsumed the Bond Agreements, as TA insists, then the jury found in response to
Question 2.b. that TA materially breached its Bond Agreement public improvement
duties. Such a finding would refute TA's argument that the jury absolved TA from
materially breaching "for any alleged failure to complete public improvements," which is
the basis on which TA minimizes the answers to Question 6, 8 and 10 to mean only that
8
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TA did not ask for any SVF question as to whether it substantially performed the
Bond Agreements. TA tries to recreate history by arguing that, in pre-trial rulings, the
trial court held that the City's Bond Agreement right to deny new phases was dependent
upon "findings related to . . . substantial performance." (TA's Rply. at 11-13 (citing R.
14351, 20834, 22162-65).) The record pages TA cites do not support its contention,
which conflicts with TA's argument to the trial court that the City's Bond Agreement
right to deny new phases was dependent on just TA's waiver and estoppel contentions:
we all knew that there were incomplete public improvements at the time of this
memorandum decision. The question was were there facts supporting the waiver
and estoppel that would prevent the enforcement of paragraph 18? That's what
was presented to the jury.
(R. 23110 p. 66-67 (emphasis added); see also R. 23295 pp. 17-18.)
In addition, TA's public improvement obligations under the Development
Agreement differed from those under the Bond Agreements, as the City demonstrated in
its opening brief. (City's Brf. at 41-44.) The Development Agreement required TA to
complete "sufficient and necessary" improvements, whereas the Bond Agreements
graphically described TA's construction duties by expressly incorporating the
construction plans; they allowed TA two years, or one year in the case of Phase 1 J, to
fulfill the plans; and they required written change orders for any deviations. (Ex. 100, §§
VII.2.E., VII.2.A.; Exs. 220, 449.)
"the Jury intended that the City receive the difference between TA's substantial
completion and complete performance of the public improvements." (TA's 1st Brf. at 16
n. 18, 18-19, 22 n.23, 24, 31.) Thus, TA's argument that the Development Agreement
incorporated the Bond Agreements undermines its explanation as to how the SVF is
reconcilable.

9
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The SVF expressly contemplated a situation in which the jury could distinguish
the public improvement requirements of the Development Agreement from those in the
Bond Agreements. Question 6 asked if TA breached just the Bond Agreements'
improvement requirements. (R. 22166.) Question 7 asked if TA breached just
Development Agreement requirements. (Id.) In Question 10, the jury could identify the
amount of damages the City suffered from TA's breach "of the Development Agreement
or the Bond Agreements based upon Tooele Associates' failure to complete public
improvements." (R. 22167 (emphasis added).) Thus, the SVF permitted the jury to
distinguish between TA's improvement duties under both types of contracts.
Arguing that the Development Agreement also incorporated the construction
plans, TA resorts to misrepresentation. TA argues that "[t]he Development Agreement
provides that TA was required to construct public improvements that comply with all
City requirements, including the approved subdivision plats and plans" (TA's Rply. at
13 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 100 §§ VI.2.E, VII.2.E, VIII.2.A, XVII.).) Actually,
the Development Agreement stated that TA was required to construct "sufficient and
necessary .. . facilities . . . in compliance with the requirements of the City, in effect at
the time ofall preliminary and final subdivision plats and all site plan approvals" (Ex.
100 §§ VI.2.E., VII.2.E, VIII.2.A., XVII. (emphasis added).) The Development
Agreement nowhere mentioned any construction plans.
TA argues that "[t]he sole purpose of Bond Agreements is to secure performance
of the public improvements obligation for each Overlake phase approved under the
Development Agreement." (TA's Rply. at 13.) That assertion simply cannot be true
10
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because the Bond Agreement that governed six out of the eight Overtake phases was
executed in October, 1996, over a year before the Development Agreement. (R. 24333
pp. 175-76; Exs. 100, 220, 267, 268, 282, 293.) The Development Agreement nowhere
mentioned the Bond Agreements or Bond Agreement amendments, and the Bond
Agreements and amendments nowhere mentioned the Development Agreement.
TA argues that compliance with the Bond Agreements was required by the
Development Agreement because "[t]he City Code required TA to execute the Bond
Agreements in order to perform under the Development Agreement, and compliance with
such 'ordinances, resolutions, policies and procedures of the City' is an incorporated term
of the Development Agreement." (TA's Rply. at 13-14.) The ordinance on which TA
relies does not support TA's argument. TA did execute Bond Agreements, and the City
never claimed otherwise.
In sum, the jury could readily differentiate TA's Bond Agreement duties from
TA's public improvement duties under the Development Agreement, including the
grounds for TA's position, set forth in the Pre-Trial Order, that "[a] breach of the Bond
Agreements or Bond Agreement amendments may not be considered a breach of the
Development Agreement." (R. 21856 n.5; R. 24339 pp. 1954-56.)
VI.

THE "SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE" DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE
TO THE CITY'S BOND AGREEMENT RIGHT TO DENY NEW PHASES.
Even if the jury had found that TA substantially performed the Bond Agreements,

TA could not avoid the City's Bond Agreement right to deny new phases with substantial
performance. Unlike the Development Agreement, the Bond Agreements consider
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11

complete performance, not substantial performance. Section 18 of the Bond Agreements
provides: "In the event of a Failure to Perform by APPLICANT, no further permits or
business licenses shall be issued

" (Ex. 220, 449.) The Bond Agreements define

"Failure to Perform" as "the non-performance in a timely manner by a party to this
Agreement of any obligation, in whole or impart, required of such party by the terms of
this Agreement." (Ex. 220 § 1.3, 449 § 1.3 (emphasis added).) Section 6 of the Bond
Agreements gave TA no more than two years to "complete" the improvements, not
substantially complete them.
Under Utah law, the doctrine of substantial performance is inapplicable when
"[t]he contract between the parties does not consider substantial completion; rather, it
considers final completion." Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dep't of Trans., 858 P.2d 1363,
1370 (Utah 1993). Reliance stands for the proposition that agreed-to consequences of
non-performance are displaced by nothing less than full performance, unless the contract
says so. 858 P.2d at 1370-71. In Reliance, the agreed-to consequence of the contractor's
untimely performance was payment to UDOT of $600 per day. Id In this case, the
agreed-to consequence of TA's non-performance "in whole or in part" is that the City is
vested with authority to deny approval for new phases. TA does not contend that the
Bond Agreements consider substantial performance.10

10

TA tries to distinguish Reliance, not because the language of the Bond Agreements
requires something less than full performance, but because the agreed-to consequence of
the non-performance in Reliance was a $600 per day imposition on the contractor, and
the consequence of TA's non-performance under the Bond Agreements is the City's right
to deny new phases. TA offers no explanation as to why that distinction makes any
difference.
12
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TA argues that, under Reliance, the agreed-to consequences of a party's nonperformance can be disregarded if the other side failed to act in "good faith." TA
misrepresents Reliance. The Reliance Court wrote:
[t]he contract between the parties does not consider substantial completion; rather,
it considers final completion as determined by the UDOT engineer. There is no
ambiguity about this point. [The contractor] and UDOT could have easily
included the term and concept of 'substantial performance' if they so intended.
The only requirement is that the engineer act in good faith in making this final
determination [of whether there has been "final completion"].
858 P.2d at 1370 (citations omitted). The "good faith" requirement in Reliance is of no
help to TA because it applied to the UDOT engineer's determination of "final
completion." In this case, the City is not relying on its own determination of
incompletion; the jury made that finding in response to SVF Question 6. Moreover, the
jury answered "NO" to Question La., which asked whether the City acted in bad faith
"[b]y refusing to recognize and accept as complete the public improvements in the
Overtake Project Area subdivision Overtake Estates Phases IB, 1C, ID, IE, IF, or 1G."
(R. 22162.)
TA argues that Reliance "left the door open for the application of substantial
performance when the complained of non-completion is minor." (TA's Rply. at 24.)
Reliance did hold that "[t]here could be a case where the work remaining on a contracted
project was so trivial" that imposing the agreed-to consequence of non-performance
would "result in gross unfairness." 858 P.2d at 1371. What the Court wrote next,
however, defeats TA's argument. The Court went on to find that the work left undone in
Reliance was not "trivial," and its reasoning applies with equal force in this case:

13
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Although the majority of the . . . project was completed, the evidence
demonstrates that certain, significant items were left undone. The site still
required signs, topsoil, permanent striping, seeding, and other warm-weather
landscaping. Even Reliance admits that approximately $350,000 worth of work
remained on the project after the October 25 completion date.
Id. In this case, TA failed to complete items at least as significant as those left undone in
Reliance, and the jury found that TA's failure to complete the public improvements
caused the City to suffer $1,750,000, five times the value of work left undone in
Reliance. Thus, applying Reliance, it cannot be said that TA's public improvement
deficiencies were minor.
VII.

THE JURY AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED TA'S
WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL CLAIMS.
Aside from non-completion of the improvements, the City's Bond Agreement

right to deny new phases depended only on disproving TA's estoppel and waiver claims.
There can be no question that TA's estoppel claims were rejected; the trial court reserved
those claims, and found against TA. (R. 24313-27, 24621-23.) In the face of the jury's
answer to Question 8 of the SVF, TA still insists that the City waived its Bond
Agreement claims. In that answer, the jury found that the City waived no Bond
Agreement claims, and the jury instructions and evidence wholly support that finding.
TA's waiver and estoppel claims faced several legal obstacles. The jury was
instructed that "Tooele City employees do not have authority to waive requirements of
the . . . Bond Agreements." (R. 22266.) TA argues that Jury Instruction 54 informed the
jury otherwise. (TA's Rply. at 7.) TA is wrong. Instruction 54 merely defined waiver
and set forth TA's waiver claim:

14
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[TA] contends that acts, statements or admissions of the Tooele City and/or its
officials and employees constituted a waiver of the City's known rights, benefits
or advantages relating to [TA]'s completion of the public improvements in
Overlake under the Development Agreement. The City denies that it waived such
rights, benefits or advantages.
(R. 22254 (emphasis added).) Nothing in Instruction 54 indicated that City employees
were capable of waiving the Bond Agreements' requirements.
In addition, by incorporating the construction plans, the Bond Agreements
required written change orders for any deviations. (Ex. 302B at I-GB-2, ^ 1; Ex. 303 at IGC-2, K 1; Ex. 304 at SHT-2, K 1; Ex. 305 at G2,T(1; Ex. 306 at G E - 2 , \ 1 ; Ex. 425 at
GJ-2, Tj 1.) Accordingly, the trial court instructed the jury that "[t]he requirement for
written change orders is binding on the parties." (R. 24341 pp 2718-19; 22268.) It was
undisputed that there was no written change order relieving TA from completing any of
the numerous incomplete public improvements identified at trial. (R. 24340, pp. 216061,2167-68,2172-73,2179,2183,2192-94.)
TA argues that based on the City Engineer's signature on Forsgren's December
29, 1997 letter, in which Forsgren certified that the Phase IB public improvements were
complete, TA believed that Phase IB was, in fact complete. (TA's Rply. at 6.) If that is
true, then why, among other things, did TA prepare a "2-16-98" document indicating that
there were $232,065 in "400 West Phase IB Items to Complete," as well as another
$209,730 in other "IB items to Complete"? (Ex. 249; 24334 pp. 608-09; see also Exs.
248, 273 at 3.) This evidence belies Forsgren's December, 1997 certification to the City
that the Phase IB public improvements were complete, and it shows that TA did not

15
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believe that it was relieved of having to finish the improvements. The jury didn't believe
it either. (R. 22166 Q. 8.)
TA points to the City's approval of building and occupancy permits and
subdivision plats as an indication that the public improvements were complete. Not so.
TA knew that the City's issuance of building and occupancy permits in a phase was no
indication that the public improvements in that phase were complete. For example, the
City issued a building permit for a lot in Phase IB on October 3, 1997, months before
Forsgren certified that the Phase IB public improvements were complete on December
29, 1997, and even longer before TA stopped working on Phase IB. (Exs. 123, 134; R.
24333 p. 288.) TA's former in-house engineer testified that he knew the City would
issue permits in a phase before all public improvements in that phase were complete. (R.
24335 pp. 775-76.) There is absolutely no evidence that anyone took the issuance of
permits as an indication that public improvements were complete.
From the beginning, TA also knew that City approval of a new phase was no
indication that public improvements in prior phases were complete. The plat for TA's
first phase, Phase 1A, was approved on May 15, 1996. (Ex. 192.) The City approved the
plat for TA's next phase—Phase IB—on March 19, 1997, even though TA did not
declare the Phase 1A public improvements to be complete until December 8, 1997. (Exs.
114, 194.) As long as TA appeared to be working on the public improvements, the City
approved plats for new phases. (R. 24339 pp. 2007-08; Exs. 301, 323 at 3.) It was only
after TA openly declared that it would no longer work to complete the improvements that

16
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the City indicated it would approve no new phases until the improvements were
complete. (R. 24339 pp. 2007-08; Ex. 323.)
The Bond Agreement amendments negate any notion that the plat approvals
waived the City's Bond Agreement right to deny additional phases. Even after the City
approved additional phases, TA agreed that "all other terms and conditions of the
Original Bond Agreement shall remain in full force and effect," including § 18 of the
Bond Agreements—the provision that vests authority in the City to deny further phases
based upon incomplete public improvements. (Ex. 267 § 3, 268 § 3; Ex. 282 § 3; Ex. 293
§3; 21874 Tf 32.)
The City's express preservation of its rights in the Bond Agreements and
amendments is likely why TA neither preserved a claim, nor asked for a jury finding, on
whether the City waived its Bond Agreement right to deny new phases. TA seems to
argue that the jury found that the City waived its Bond Agreement right to deny new
phases. (TA's Rply. Brf. at 10, 12.) With respect to the Bond Agreements and public
improvement requirements of the Development Agreement, however, TA claimed at trial
only that the City waived its rights to claim that the improvements were incomplete and
for the completion of such improvements. In the Pre-Trial Order, TA expressed its
waiver claim as follows:
[TA] claims that the City waived any and all claims that the public improvements
within the Overtake subdivisions Over lake Estates Phases IB, 1C, ID, IE, IF, 1G
and U are incomplete and has waived any and all rights to the completion of such
improvements. Accordingly, [TA] asserts that it is entitled to a judgment finding
that the City waived any and all claims that the public improvements within the
Overlake subdivisions Overlake Estates Phases IB, 1C, ID, IE, IF, 1G and 1J are

17
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incomplete and has waived any and all rights to the completion of such public
improvements.
(R. 21850 (emphasis added).) TA's waiver claim was similarly expressed to the jury:
[TA] contends that acts, statements or admissionsof the Tooele City and/or its
officials and employees constituted a waiver of the City's known rights, benefits
or advantages relating to [TA 's] completion of the public improvements in
Overlake under the Development Agreement.
(R. 22254 (emphasis added); 22064.) The manner in which TA expressed its waiver
claim explains why there was no question in the SVF about whether the City waived its
Bond Agreement right to deny new phases, as opposed to the City's "rights to claim that
[TA] did not complete public improvements in Overlake required by the Development
Agreement and the Bond Agreements." (R. 22166 Q. 8.) In short, TA never asked for a
jury finding that the City waived its Bond Agreement right to deny new phases based
upon incomplete public improvements, and TA failed to preserve such a claim in the PreTrial Order. Accordingly, the City focused its efforts at proving that it did not waive its
claim that TA failed to complete the improvements.
TA focuses on a jury finding that the City breached the Development Agreement
and the implied covenant "by refusing to recognize and accept its own admissions that
public improvements with the Overlake Project Area's subdivisions were complete."
(TA's Rply. at 7.) TA ignores the jury's finding that the City did not breach the
Development Agreement and the implied covenant "[b]y refusing to recognize and accept
as complete the public improvements in the Overlake Project Area subdivisions Overlake
Estates Phases IB, 1C, ID, IE, IF or 1G." (R. 22162 Q. la.)
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TA also insists that the jury found that the City made it impossible for TA to
follow TA's own construction drawings. (TA's Rply. at 17.) TA, however, can identify
no jury finding that the City somehow prevented TA from knowing what its construction
plans required or fulfilling those requirements. Instead, TA points to jury findings that
the City slowed or refused to give final inspections; misinterpreted and misapplied public
improvement ordinances; refused to recognize and accept admissions that public
improvements were complete; required TA to construct to standards outside the
Development Agreement, the construction plans, the Bond Agreements, City ordinances
"and/or" standards not imposed on other developers. (R. 22162-63 Q. le., l.f, l.g., l.h.)
TA has never explained how such conduct interfered with its ability to follow its own
construction plans.
TA's arguments are just a cover for the real reason that TA failed to complete the
improvements. According to TA's former Vice President and designated liaison with the
City, the "real reason Tooele Associates didn't finish those streets" was "[tjhere was no
money to build roads." (R. 24339, pp. 2055-56, 2069-70.)
VIII. THE ONLY TENABLE SVF INTERPRETATION IS THE ONE
ADVANCED BY THE CITY.
The simplest way to reconcile the answers to Questions 3 and 8 is by
acknowledging Question 3's disjunctive and Question 8's conjunctive nature. The jury
found in response to Question 3 that the City waived certain claims under the
Development Agreement "and/or" the Bond Agreements. The jury found in response to
Question 8 that the City did not waive claims under the Development Agreement "and"
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the Bond Agreements. Together, Question 3 and Question 8 mean that the City waived
claims under either the Development Agreement or the Bond Agreements, but not both.
Other aspects of Question 3 indicate that the jury intended to find that the City waived
Development Agreement claims rather than the Bond Agreement claims. For one,
Question 3 contained a qualification—"as stated in Question 2," and Question 2 related
solely to the Development Agreement. In addition, Question 3 dealt only with
"material[] breach[]" claims, and the "material breach" concept was limited to the
Development Agreement and had nothing to do with the Bond Agreements. According
to the trial court, this is "[t]he only reading of the SVF that comes close to harmonizing
the apparent inconsistencies." (R. 24300.)
TA is wrong to argue that this approach requires language to be altered, "does not
permit the co-existence of Questions 3 and 8 as they are drafted," and "require[s] that the
Court essentially disregard approximately two-thirds of the [SVF]." (TA's Rply. at 8.)
Under the City's interpretation, no words need to be added, subtracted or altered. As the
trial court found, the City's interpretation is the only reading that gives weight to all the
terms of Questions 3 and 8. (R. 24296-300.) Under the City's interpretation, Question 3
can coexist with Question 8, because Question 3 disjunctively references the
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements with the use of "and/or," unlike
Question 8.
The City's interpretation does not disregard any part of the SVF. The elimination
of the basis for TA's alleged damages will occur no mater which side's interpretation this
Court adopts, because both interpretations acknowledge the jury findings of TA's Bond
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Agreement breaches and the City's non-waiver of such breaches. Such findings, along
with the dismissal of TA's estoppel claims, trigger the City's Bond Agreement right to
deny new phases, upon which TA's alleged damages indisputably depend.
The elimination of the basis for TA's alleged damages is not a function of either
side's interpretation. Rather, that is a function of the application of the law, which is
required by Utah R. Civ. P. 58A and Utah case law directing trial courts to apply the law
to special verdict findings and render "the appropriate judgment." Utah R. Civ. P.
58A(a); Judd ex rel Montgomery v. Drezga. 2004 UT 91 Tf 34, 103 P.3d 135;
Brigham.470 P.2d at 397-98; Milligan v. Capitol Furn. Co., 335 P.2d 619, 622 (Utah
1959);11 Dishinger 2001 UT App 209fflf16-17, 30. As these cases hold, the
11

TA misrepresents Milligan to try to distinguish it. As explained in the City's opening
brief, the Milligan court applied the old law of contributory negligence to the jury's
finding that plaintiff was negligent, even though the jury also found that the plaintiffs
negligence was not a proximate cause of his injury and determined the "'amount of
money [that] would fairly and adequately recompense the plaintiff" 335 P.2d at 621-22.
TA argues that "there was no jury finding on proximate causation (therefore, the Court's
finding on the issue as a matter of law was not contrary to factual findings of the jury)."
(TA's Rply. at 12 n. 18.) TA is flat wrong. The reported decision quotes the following
special verdict questions and answers:
"Question V
"Was plaintiff negligent in walking across the ice where he fell?
"Answer Yes

"Question VI
"Was such negligence a proximate cause of plaintiff s fall?
"Answer No."
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"appropriate judgment" is the one that results from the application of the law to jury
findings, even if that result conflicts with other jury findings.12
IX.

TA'S INTERPRETATION IS FULL OF CONTRADICTIONS.
Unlike the City's SVF interpretation, TA's suffers from internal inconsistencies.
A.

On One Hand, TA Insists That The Jury Rejected The City's Bond
Agreement Right To Deny New Phases, And On The Other Hand, TA
Argues That Such Right Was "Hidden" From The Jury.

TA tries to present an interpretation that not only reconciles the answers in the
SVF, but also eliminates the City's Bond Agreement right to deny new phases based
upon incomplete improvements. TA's position fails, in part, because the jury didn't even
consider that right. TA itself argues that "[t]he Jury was never informed that the City
claimed Paragraph 18 of the Bond Agreement allowed it to kill the entire Overlake
335 P.2d at 621 (alteration in original). That was a clear finding on proximate causation.
Because there was insufficient evidence to support it, the Utah Supreme Court upset that
finding in response to a claim of special verdict inconsistency. Id at 622.
12

TA argues that Dishinger is inapplicable because in that case "all legal theories were
presented to the Jury," but in this case, the City's Bond Agreement right to deny new
phases "was hidden from the Jury." (TA's Rply. at 12 n.18.) TA, however, never
explains why that distinction makes a difference. TA cites no authority that the City was
required to present its Bond Agreement right to the jury in order to preserve it.
The distinction that TA points out actually bolsters the City's position. The
presentation of "all legal theories" to the Dishinger jury indicates that trial courts must
apply the law to special verdicts and render appropriate judgments, even if the judgments
conflict with certain jury findings. In Dishingerf the jury found that the landlord was
"entitled to recover." 2001 UT App 209 f 7. Nevertheless, after applying the law of
accord and satisfaction to certain special verdict findings and undisputed facts, the
Dishinger majority reached the opposite conclusion and held that the landlord should
recover nothing. Id. *f 30. The Dishinger majority reached this conclusion even though,
as TA points out, the jury was given an instruction on the law of accord and satisfaction,
which it presumably followed. IdL TJ13 n.4. Hence, Dishinger stands for the proposition
that a trial court must render the judgment that the law requires, even if the jury applied
the same law and came to a different conclusion.
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project..." (TA's 1st Brf. at 52-53; TA's Rply. at 12 n.18.) The jurors could not find
the City waived a right that wasn't presented to them.13
B.

TA Makes Conflicting Assertions Regarding The Impact Of Jury
Instructions And The Jury's Ability To Apply Instructions And
Differentiate Contracts.

When it comes to the City's argument that the induced-difficulty-of-performance
and mitigation jury instructions refute TA's claim that the City interfered with TA's
performance, TA argues that "[speculating as to how the Jury applied each of the 99
pages of Jury Instructions to each specific question . . . does little to aid in harmonizing
the Verdict." (TA's Rply. at 18.) On the contrary, following Utah law, which presumes
that juries follow jury instructions, is not "Speculating." Moore,631 P.2d at 869.
Moreover, TA's argument is ironic considering that TA's SVF interpretation relies
entirely upon the jury applying the "material breach" and "substantial performance"
instructions to the Bond Agreements, even though those instructions were confined to the
Development Agreement and nowhere mentioned the Bond Agreements.
TA further argues that questioning TA's speculation as to how the jury applied the
"material breach" and "substantial performance" instructions "unreasonably doubts the
intelligence of this Jury which carefully and thoughtfully rendered the Verdict." (Id at
19.) Of course, the same could be said about TA's questioning the jurors' ability to apply

u

De Feliciano v. De Jesus, 873 F.2d 447, 451 (1st Cir. 1989) ("We must assume that
juries follow instructions, and that they do not 'consider and base their decisions on legal
questions with respect to which they are not charged.'" (Quoting Los Angeles v. Heller,
475 U.S. 796, 798 (1986)).
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the induced-difficulty-of-performance and mitigation instructions, as well TA's doubts of
the jurors' ability to distinguish the Bond Agreements from the Development Agreement.
C.

TA Argues That Matters Unknown To The Jury Are Irrelevant In
Interpreting The SVF, But Then Relies On The Alleged Intent Of The
SVF Drafters To Support Its Interpretation.

Both sides and the trial court agree that when interpreting the jury's SVF answers,
only matters presented to the jury are relevant. (R. 24286-87; TA's 1st Brf. at 25, 44;
TA's Rply. at 2.) TA, however, supports its interpretation of SVF Question 3 with a
discussion that occurred outside the jury's presence during the jury instruction
conference. (TA's Rply. at 20-21.) The jury was not privy to that discussion, so it is
unhelpful in interpreting the jury's answers to the SVF.
X.

THE "MATERIAL BREACH" AND "SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE"
INSTRUCTIONS SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE JURY
FOUND THAT THE CITY WAIVED ONLY DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENT BREACHES, NOT BOND AGREEMENT BREACHES.
TA's current attempt to avoid the consequences of its Bond Agreement breaches

on the basis of the "material breach" and "substantial performance" concepts conflicts
with how those concepts were presented to the jury and what the jury was directed to find
with respect to Bond Agreement breaches.
A.

The "Material Breach" Concept Identified SVF Question 3 With The
Development Agreement.

An important qualification in SVF Question 3 was the term "materially," and its
use of that term further indicates that the jury's "YES" answer to Question 3 concerned
only the City's Development Agreement claims, not Bond Agreement claims. As the
City explained in its opening brief, the use of the term "material" in SVF § I further
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identified that section with the Development Agreement rather than the Bond
Agreements. The "material breach" concept was important in the context of § I of the
SVF, but not in § II. During oral argument on how to harmonize the SVF, TA conceded
that "the word 'material' . . . relates to the Development Agreement and not the Bond
Agreement." (R. 23008 p. 41.) As explained to the jury, the "materiality" of TA's
Development Agreement breaches would excuse the City's performance of the
Development Agreement. (R. 22265.) Thus, Questions 2 and 3 made use of the term.
In contrast, the term "material" is completely absent from § II of the SVF. The
jury was simply never asked to determine whether TA's Bond Agreement breaches were
material. TA conceded to the trial court that "you know, they're right when they say
there is no real jury determination as to material in 6, 7 and 8." (R. 23110 p. 40.)
Furthermore, all the instructions that explain the concept of "material breach" relate
solely to the Development Agreement. (R. 22204, 22265.) Because neither party
claimed that its performance of the Bond Agreements was excused by the other side's
non-performance, the "materiality" of Bond Agreement breaches was irrelevant.
B.

The "Substantial Performance" Concept Was Irrelevant To The Bond
Agreements.

TA argues that the "substantial performance" concept is the "key" to reconciling
the SVF. That concept, however, was irrelevant to the Bond Agreements. "Substantial
performance" was important in § I of the SVF because, as Instruction 35 explained, TA's
substantial performance of the Development Agreement would entitle TA to a second 10year term and allow TA to recover for the City's alleged breach of the Development
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Agreement, even if TA failed to completely perform that agreement. (R. 22209.) The
"substantial performance" concept, as explained to the jury in Instruction 35, had no
relation to the Bond Agreements.
Not only were the Bond Agreements mentioned nowhere in any of the jury
instructions dealing with substantial performance (R. 22209-10), but TA sought no relief
under the Bond Agreements, let alone any relief that depended upon its substantial
performance of those agreements. Instruction 35 confined the substantial performance to
the context of a TA claim for relief: "[TA] claims that even though it did not do
everything exactly as the Development Agreement required, it substantially performed
the Development Agreement and, therefore, is entitled to [relief]'' (R. 22209 (emphasis
added).) TA, however, had no claim for relief under the Bond Agreements, so the
substantial performance concept, as described to the jury, had no application to those
agreements.
XL

STRIPPED OF ITS CONTRADICTIONS, TA'S SVF INTERPRETATION
BOILS DOWN TO THE NOTION, UNTENABLE UNDER UTAH LAW,
THAT THE JURY WANTED BOTH SIDES TO RECOVER MONEY.
The main difference between the parties' SVF interpretations is that the City's

interpretation focuses on the differences between the contracts that governed TA's public
improvement construction, and, unable to present a consistent reconciliation of the SVF
answers, TA's interpretation boils down to its assertion that the jury just wanted TA to
get millions of dollars. Under Utah law, however, juries are not allowed to dictate the
legal consequences of their findings. Juddt 2004 UT 91 f 33. Courts award damages,
not juries. Brighamf 470 P.2d at 397-98. In a special verdict case, the jury find facts,
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and the court applies the law thereto to arrive at "the appropriate judgment." Utah R.
Civ. P. 58A(a); Brigham, 470 P.2d at 397-98; Milligan, 335 P.2d at 622; Dishinger. 2001
UT App 209 THf 16-17, 30. Thus, as a legal matter, the SVF cannot be viewed as an
"award." Nor can the SVF's text support TA's characterization. The jury was not asked
to determine the damages each side should recover. The jury was asked to determine the
amount of "losses" or "damages" each side "suffered" or "will suffer." (R. 22165-68.) It
is the law that determines whether such losses may be recovered. Accordingly, the
question of whether the SVF answers can be reconciled cannot be resolved upon the
theory that the jury intended the parties to recover the damages it found.
XII.

ANY INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN QUESTIONS 3 AND 8 MAY BE
RESOLVED BY DISREGARDING THE ANSWER TO QUESTION 3,
WHICH LACKS EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT.
TA does not dispute the rule that if a special verdict answer lacks evidentiary

support, it may be disregarded. American Cas. Co. v. B. Cianciolo, Inc., 987 F.2d 1302,
1305-06 (7th Cir. 1993); Milligan, 335 P.2d at 622. Instead, TA argues that the jury's
finding in response to Question 3—that the City waived TA's failure to pay irrigation
water bills—has evidentiary support.
"'Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.. .. The conduct of a
party waiving a right must evince unequivocally an intent to waive, or must be
inconsistent with any other intent.5" Larsen Beverage and Globe Ind. Co. v. Labor
Comm'n, 2011 UT App 69 \ 8, 250 P.3d 82 (alteration in original) (quoting Medley v.
Medley, 2004 UT App 179 If 7, 93 P.3d 847). Waiver may be decided as a matter of law
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where the evidence of waiver is lacking. IHC Health Servs., 2008 UT 73 If 19; Clarke v.
American Concept Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
All of TA's alleged waiver evidence relates to the format of the invoices sent to
TA for secondary water use. (TA's Rply. at 27-28.) There could be no waiver, however,
unless the City representatives who prepared the invoices had authority to waive the
City's Development Agreement right to payment for the water. See Westside Dixon
Assocs. LLC v. Utah Power & Light Co., 2002 UT 311ft 19-20, 44 P.3d 775 (rejecting
claim that an electric utility waived its claim to individually meter condos because the
utility lacked authority to permit master metering). According to Jury Instruction 64,
City employees, including those who prepared the invoices, lacked authority to waive
TA's Development Agreement duties. (R. 22266.) Thus, the jury could not find waiver
on the basis of such invoices.
Moreover, there was no evidence that the City waived its Development Agreement
right to amounts owed for secondary water. TA nowhere argues that the City decided not
to send invoices or statements identifying how much TA owed. It was undisputed that
the City sent invoices and statements to TA. (R. 24340 pp. 2359-60, e ^ , Ex. 546.) Nor
does TA argue that the City sent invoices and statements indicating that TA should pay
less than TA actually owed. Instead, TA argues that, even though the City's invoices and
statements demanded payment in the amount the City claimed at trial, the invoices were
not supported by meter readings. An invoice that demands payment but omits support for
the demanded amount simply does not evidence an unequivocal intent to waive payment
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of the amount due. There is nothing inconsistent between the demand for payment and
the omission of the meter readings.
In any event, TA's argument about the lack of meter readings is a complete red
herring. As TA points out, TA paid the invoices that lacked meter readings. (TA's Rply.
at 27.) TA even paid the invoices that were sent before the City installed meters on the
lakes in 2004. (Id) TA's last payment was made on December 18, 2006. (R. 24340 pp.
2360-61; Ex. 545.) The City's claim was for secondary water payments due and owing
after gallon meters were installed in 2004 and after the City started sending TA the meter
readings on March 1, 2007.14 (R. 24340 pp. 2357, 2365-66, Ex. 546.) The invoices that
TA refused to pay were those that accompanied meter readings. (R. 24340 p. 2373, Ex.
546.) Thus, the only alleged facts TA identifies to support a waiver of the City's
secondary water claim—the lack of meters until 2004 and the absence of meter readings
from invoices until March 2007—has no application to the invoices TA failed to pay,
which were based on meter readings and did identify them.15
XIII. THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF A NEW TRIAL MAY BE AFFIRMED
ON ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS.
This Court may affirm the trial court's decision
"if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record,.. . and
this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by
14

Also on March 1, 2007, the City provided TA the "accounting" that had TA requested.
(Exs. 545, 546.)
15

Even before 2004, the City's invoices to TA were based on meter readings. Prior to
2004, the quantity of water that TA used was determined with "hour" meters, and TA or
its agent read the meters and reported the readings to the City. (R. 24340 p. 2356, R.
24339 pp. 2027-29.)
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appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on
by the lower court".16
The rule applies equally to appeals from interlocutory orders. Doe v. Maret 1999 UT 74
I t 1, 5, 984 P.2d 980, overruled on other grounds, Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91
t t 9-10, 173 P.3d 848. As demonstrated in the City's opening brief, the record presents
several grounds to affirm the trial court's new trial decision. One is the lack of
evidentiary support for the finding that the City waived TA's material breach of the
Development Agreement for failing to pay for irrigation water, as discussed above.
A.

The City Could Not Have Breached The Development Agreement By
Unreasonably Withholding Prior Consent To Assignments Because TA
Had Already Assigned The Development Agreement Before Asking
For Consent.

TA disputes that it had already assigned the Development Agreement before
asking the City for consent. In the face of its assignee's testimony,17 TA argues that it
never assigned the Development Agreement. (TA's Rply. at 29.) TA, however,
judicially admitted that by "March of 2005," it had already assigned the Development
Agreement in the manner reflected in its later requests for consent. (R. 3765-68 Iflf 3031, 34, 36-37, 39-43 and 46; 3823-25fflf376-85.) The trial court held that TA was bound
by such admissions, even though TA was allowed to file a later pleading amendment. (R.
10741 n.l.) Because the jury's answer to SVF Question l.b. was contrary to law (Howe

10

Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61 Tf 18, 29 P.3d 1225 (emphasis added) (quoting Limb v.
Federated Milk Producers Ass'a 461 P.2d 290, 293 n. 2 (Utah 1969)); Advanced
Restoration, LLC v. Priskos, 2005 UT App 505 129 n.6, 126 P.3d 786.
17

R. 24338 pp. 1600-01; see also Ex. 515 at cover and Memo, of Und. 1N 11-13, 16-19.
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v. Professional Manivest Inc., 829 P.2d 160, 163-64 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)) and
unsupported by the evidence, the trial court's order for a new trial may be affirmed.
B.

The Jury's Calculation Of TA's Alleged Damages Was Excessive.

TA's damages evidence was fundamentally flawed. TA advanced only an
expectancy, or benefit-of-the-bargain, measure of damages, but it is undisputed that TA
deducted from its alleged damages none of the costs that it would have incurred to
qualify for the Development Agreement's benefits. (R. 21909; 24337 p. 1310-11, 133738.) TA took the position that it was not required to deduct such costs. (R. 21909-11;
24337 p. 1311.) Hence, TA wanted to recover the value of the agreement's benefits from
2003 to 2017 without deducting the costs it would have incurred under that agreement to
qualify for such benefits, such as the costs to develop and sell lots. (R. 24334 pp. 467-69,
569-71; 24335 pp. 924-25; R. 24338 p. 1602; R. 24341 p. 2581; 22165-66.) Under Utah
law, TA had the burden of proving such costs, but it is undisputed that TA presented no
evidence of them. TruGreen Cos. v. Mower, 2008 UT 81 Tf 10, 199 P.3d 929; Ford v.
Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 2004 UT 70 ^ 39, 98 P.3d 15; Sawyers v. FMA Leasing
Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774-75 (Utah 1986); R. 22262.
18

TA's argument regarding Jason Burningham's calculations is false, but even if
true, it does not excuse TA from satisfying TA's legal burden of proving the costs TA
18

Mr. Burningham's calculations do not support TA's alleged damages. The City
commissioned Mr. Burningham to prepare an expert report on the City's restitution
damages. Prior to trial, the City decided not to present Burningham's opinions, and it
joined a TA motion in limine to exclude them. (R. 21304-05.) TA decided to advance
them itself, contending that they somehow supported TA's alleged damages calculations.
They do not. Because his assignment was to calculate the City's damages, not TA's, Mr.
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avoids by recovering the value of Development Agreement benefits without having to
perform the agreement to get them. Contrary to TA's argument, the City raised the
flawed nature of TA's alleged damages to the trial court (R. 21777-843) and in its July 2,
2010 Answer to Petition to Appeal and Cross-Petition to Appeal Interlocutory Orders at
pages 4, 8-9, 19-20, filed with this Court.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling and direct the trial court to enter
judgment in the City's favor. Otherwise, the Court should affirm the trial court's order
for a new trial because TA's interpretation of the SVF is untenable or, alternatively,
certain jury findings lack evidentiary support or are contrary to law.
DATED this 13th day of July, 2011.

George M. Haley
\J
/
Christopher R. Hogle
Attorneys for Appellee and
Cross-Appellant, Tooele City Corporation

Burningham measured benefits of the Development Agreement that TA had already
received and enjoyed, (R. 24336 pp. 1215-16, 1218.) In fact, TA indisputably realized
those benefits when TA sold all but 55 acres of the Overtake property at prices that were
enhanced based on the notion that Development Agreement entitlements were transferred
along with the property. (R. 24334 pp. 571-73, 576-77; 24338 pp. 1577-80; Ex. 271 at 4,
§ 10(c)(ii)-(iii); Ex. 270 at 9-1, § 9.1; Exs. 467, 468.)
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